the comments below are from the comptroller of the currency for the United States, John Dugan. If he believes this then we will have a hard time trying to level the playing field:
Today's severe consumer credit problems can be traced to the multi-year policy of easy money and easy credit that led to an asset bubble, with too many people getting loans that could not be repaid when the bubble burst. With respect to these loans - especially mortgages - the core problem was lax underwriting that relied too heavily on rising house prices. Inadequate consumer protections - such as inadequate and ineffective disclosures - contributed to this problem, because in many cases consumers did not understand the significant risks of complex loans that had seductively low initial monthly payments. Both aspects of the problem - lax underwriting and inadequate consumer protections - were especially acute in loans made by nonbank lenders that were not subject to federal regulation.
In terms of changes to financial consumer protection regulation, legislation should be targeted to the two types of fundamental gaps that fueled the current mortgage crisis. The first gap relates to consumer protection rules themselves, which were written under a patchwork of authorities scattered among different agencies; were in some cases not sufficiently robust or timely; and importantly, were not applied to all financial services providers, bank or nonbank, uniformly. The second gap relates to implementation of consumer protection rules, where there was no effective mechanism or framework to ensure that nonbank financial institutions complied with rules to the same extent as regulated banks. That is, the so-called "shadow banking system" of nonbank firms, such as finance companies and mortgage brokers, provides products comparable to those provided by banks, but is not subject to comparable oversight. This shadow banking system has been widely recognized as central to the most abusive subprime lending that fueled the mortgage crisis.
It seems to me that the part he left out was that most of the lax underwriting was from the Banks themselves.
Ross Miller