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JOE MURIN
Managing Director
Murin was appointed CEO of Ginnie Mae in 2008. Prior, he served as Chief Executive Officer of Lender Services Inc....

BRIAN MONTGOMERY
Managing Director
As FHA Commissioner, Brian Montgomery was responsible for the oversight and modernization of the insurance fund’s $600 billion portfolio. He was responsible for HUD's regulatory responsibilities to...

BRIAN O'REILLY
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O’Reilly has 23 years of financial services industry experience. Co-founder of Capital Financial Solutions, O’Reilly earlier was Fannie Mae’s Director of Automated Underwriting and Risk Management Solutions...

TIM ROOD
Managing Director
Rood brings to The Collingwood Group two decades of mortgage industry experience. He co-founded Capital Financial Solutions. He was Vice President at First American, where he successfully lead the company’s professional services group...

JIM RUSSELL
Managing Director
Russell has 37 years of financial management and advisory experience. Most recently he was Managing Director of Prescient, Inc. where he led project teams for USDA, HUD, ICE, CUNA and SBA, and secured more than $400 million in federal government contracts.

GARY CUNNINGHAM
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Gary Cunningham was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regulatory Affairs at HUD where he led the successful efforts to develop and implement the RESPA reform rule and GFE and HUD-1 that...

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The Collingwood Group has partnered with Mortgage News Daily to bring you the VOICE OF HOUSING Blog.  Contributors include former Ginnie Mae CEO Joe Murin and former FHA Commissioner Brian Montgomery.
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Will Pressuring Loan Servicers Be Counterproductive?

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Treasury is becoming impatient with servicer performance despite their investments and success with processing trial loan modifications.

The program was/is targeted to help 3-4 million homeowners that were distressed or where imminent default within 60 days was likely. Treasury provided servicers with real economic incentive to aggressively pursue and negotiate loan modifications with the prospect of an up-front fee of $1,000 for each modification ($1,500 if the borrower was current) and $1,000 a year in which the borrower makes their modified payments. Consider that net income to servicers was $161 in 2008, per MBA Cost Study, and you’ve got one heck of an opportunity to make a lot of money while “doing good” as a servicer.

Servicers have hired thousands of people over the last year to handle the massive demand for modification services triggered by the Treasury’s Home Affordable Modification Program. Yet, Treasury claims that “only a tiny fraction” of trial modifications have been made permanent.” That despite the trial period being extended to 5 months.

The problem is that servicers have to field 5 calls for every 1 that appears to qualify. Of the borrowers that appear to qualify and that provide the necessary information to process a loan modification request, only a handful are actually returning the supporting documentation and signed agreements. This is occurring even though the number of documents that a modification applicant has to sign is down to only two, and many servicers are not even requiring borrowers to fully document their income, i.e. stated income.

In an effort to get servicers to be even more diligent in improving conversion rates, Treasury is now telling servicers that they will not receive “a penny” from them until and unless the temporary modification converts to a permanent modification. While this would incent servicers to work every more diligently to convert trial modifications in the pipeline, I would be concerned that servicers now bare fallout costs for issues they cannot control, i.e. over indebtedness, unemployment, negative equity, etc.

My fear is that the compelling incentive - $1,000 upfront and $1,000 a year – now has a condition that makes it uneconomical for servicers to comply and actually creates a massive disincentive for servicers to pursue and process trial modification applicants.

 
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on
Tim, A client emailed me this response from Indymac Mortgage Services as he continues to pursue a modification with Indybank/Onewest which begs the questions: 1. Are servicers really the decision making entiities in this whole modification process? 2. How do you modify a loan quickly and efficiently if you have to cater to up to a dozen or more pro-rata shareholding investors who assume a guarantee of "timely payment of principal and interest" at the original terms of the note? 3. Can a borrower (or the public) obtain a copy of the master servicing agreement to verify the "eligibility requirements" or is this like asking the government to reveal the recipients of the first TARP installment--too detrimental to them if publicly acknowledged? Your loan is part of a private securitization we service, meaning it has been "pooled" with other similary mortgages that comprise the underlying assets in a mortgage backed security (MBS). Each MBS may be sold in whole or in part such that one investor - a dozen or more depending on the size of the MBS - may own a portion of that MBS. It is important to understand that the investors do not "own" the individual mortgages comprising the MBS; instead, each investor owns a pro-rata share of the MBS. Each MBS has a specific name and or number, and each MBS has a "master servicer" or trustee to whom we remit payments and reports. We enter into a servicing agreement with the master servicer for each MBS. Among other responsibilities, the typical servicing agreement delegates to IndyMac Mortgage Services, a division of OneWest Bank, FSB, the responsibility of reponding to borrowers' inquiries, including their requests for loan modifications. The master servicer generally does not respond to borrowers' inquiries; instead, the inquiries are re-directed to us for our responses. The master servicer does not approve or decline requests for loan modifications. Instead, the master servicing agreement sets forth the eligibility requirements for loan modifications and other assistance programs. Would love some input on this--seems like the focus is too narrowly on the servicer, when they are simply operating on the terms of the "master servicing agreement" ???
on
Conditional "safe harbors" are afforded to the majority of servicers by Treasury in an effort to mitigate the risks of upsetting one shareholder group over another in "class warfare." I'll admit that not many servicers want to test the strength and teeth of those safe harbors. While outside of my wheelhouse - In some instances the Master Servicer is the primary servicer and other times it is not. I would imagine that when it is not the master servicer their role would be much like that of the Trustee - "brain dead."
on
Safe harbor seems to be counterproductive to the entire modification effort (not to mention an obstacle to full transparency)...if all share holders have to be appeased to prevent class warfare, how many modifications are really likely to be approved (I'm assuming each investor wants continued guaranteed payment of principal and interest)? And if the Master Servicer is NOT the primary servicer, isn't any modification coming to this "brain dead" entity dead on arrival?
on
Like most everything else in the mortgage business I suspect the trust and verify method will prevail. The Primary Servicer will trust they are acting in accordance with the PSA (investors interests) and will trust that Treasury will provide them with a safe harbor when HAMP conflicts with MSAs, and the Master Servicer and/or Trustee will verify their compliance with their duties and obligations. Verifications are happening more but not often enough.
on
I think we are missing something in the conversation here, The bottom line is that a $270k performing note is better than a $300k non performing note, it is better for the investor and homeowner. The way it was explained at a hearing in DC early on in the crisis; most if not all servicing agreements require the servicer to take what ever action is required for the greatest financial benefit. In the majority of the situation modifications is better financially for all involved except the servicer. The situation is the servicers do not have the manpower to complete the job, they do not have the professional processors and underwriter working on the project. MHA is a reasonable program but it is not being implemented properly. We hear time and time again it is the homeowners fault for not supplying the proper doc, that the homeowner may default after the trial period and so on and so on. We hear excuse after excuse from the servicer's and Treasury but we continue to negatively impact the overall recovery by not getting the job done. This is not rocket science, we have underwriting guidelines under MHA, lets just give the program a chance by bringing in the professionals to do the job. Lets decision these loan right up-front, one way or another.
on
Steven, Well said, I am not as highly intelligent as all the guest in this forum but I feel that good old common sense has gotten lost somewhere in our current world view. The Servicing companies needs to take some heat to expedite the process as well as the investor for allowing such outrageous loans to be given in the first place. There is plenty of blame to go around at the top, but this is not solving the problem with the homeowner, who didn't go into this saying, "I'll get a loan and buy a house just so in a year or two I can get foreclosed on". The banking industry held out the carrot and people took it, so now don't blame the mule for eating it and the banks find they are not going where you wanted to go. These people lost their jobs and don't know where to go either. So while those with the money are like squirrels stuffing their fat cheeks with every little morsel they can find and not trying to solve the problem. My god what a convoluted money corrupted system we have evolved into. My opinion is make the loan reasonable, help repair the problem with expeditious diligence by speeding up the process and get our country back on it's feet and help a few people along the way. I really don't see much different from those at the top and those below, except those on top make the ones below suffer for their mistakes and bad investments, and rush off to their next board meeting.
on
Steve-ideally, this wouldn't be rocket science, but read the text of the letter from the SERVICER I posted above...the servicer does not appear to be the "decision making entity". The servicer is beholden to the "master or primary" servicer, who answers to a master servicing agreement that needs to satisfy MBS shareholders requirements. What do the MBS shareholders want? If I go back to my MBS knowledge base training they want: Guaranteed payment of principal and interest...how does MHA or strongarming the front line servicer solve the problem when a dozen or more MBS shareholders (per letter above) are protected by Treasury safe harbor regulations (as Tim points out) than can effectively) prevent a permanent modification from ever occuring, if they (Master Servicer/MBS shareholders) don't agree that the modification request meets the eligibility requirement set forth in the master servicing agreement? You say 'In the majority of the situation modifications is better financially for all involved except the servicer'--but you leave out the fact that is also not better for the master/servicer and the dozen or so MBS pro rata share holders...who may be the investor class of...dare I say it...too big to fail category? I'm all for letting professionals do the job and "decision these upfront in the interest of what is best for consumers and the housing industry, but that is an unrealistic goal if the process doesn't allow the "professionals" to talk with the REAL decision makers upfront.
on
Tim-(my final comment of the evening..I promise)-if I'm reading your final response, the trust and verify system exists primarily to serve the investors interests, with the Treasury ready to come in and give them "safe harbor" from any undue pressure from the consumer initiated HAMP modification requests? In a nutshell--the servicer as defined by the most current Obama "shaming" effort has little to no control over making more modifications occur, and effectively is just a powerless scapegoat with little power to affect improved modification outcomes??
on
Well it's wrong to think that everybody is powerless, e.g. the trustee, the investor, the servicer, the master servicer. Ultimately, it is the servicers responsibility to do what's in the best interest of the investor. Some PSAs are more explicit than others on how to do that. Once a servicer has satisfied themeselves that they have done their best to inform MBS investors to their intention to follow the Home Affordable guidelines they are best served adhere to Treasury's requirements under HAMP/HARP and should be covered under the dafe harbor provision. Not much legal precedent for servicers to have much comfort though...

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